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Locke v. Davey: Discretion, Discrimination, 
and the New Free Exercise∗ 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The First Amendment to the United States Constitution reads, in 
pertinent part, “Congress shall make no law respecting the establishment 
of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.”1  The Supreme 
Court and many commentators have long subscribed to the notion that 
this language cannot be read as a whole but that the two clauses must be 
read independently.2  The crux of much Religion Clause jurisprudence 
lies in the inherent tension in giving full legal effect to each clause.  As 
Chief Justice Burger wrote in Walz v. Tax Commission, “[t]he Court has 
struggled to find a neutral course between the two religion clauses, both 
of which are cast in absolute terms, and either of which, if expanded to a 
logical extreme, would tend to clash with the other.”3  Problems 
frequently arise in situations where a neutral, generally applicable law 
affects religious exercise.  On the one hand, a failure to make exceptions 
to such laws for religious practices may end up burdening free exercise.  
On the other, granting such exceptions arguably constitutes a 
governmental establishment of religion, in the sense that the government 
is advancing, or at least aiding, that religion.  Such issues have vexed the 
Court for years in diverse situations, ranging from whether to grant 
churches tax exemptions,4 to whether to allow exceptions to truancy laws 
for children attending religious education classes.5  In recent years, the 
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 1. U.S. CONST. amend. I.  The Religion Clauses were first incorporated into the Fourteenth 
Amendment and applied to the states by Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940). 
 2. See, e.g., Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 677 (1971) (“Numerous cases considered by 
the Court have noted the internal tension in the First Amendment between the Establishment Clause 
and the Free Exercise Clause.”). 
 3. 397 U.S. 664, 668–69 (1970). 
 4. Id. 
 5. Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952). 
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tension between the clauses often has been at issue in cases involving the 
availability of public funding for religious education. 
The Supreme Court’s recent decision in Locke v. Davey6 exemplifies 
the two clauses in conflict.  At issue in Locke was a program established 
by the Washington State Legislature awarding scholarship funding to all 
qualifying, Washington high-school seniors.  The legislation establishing 
the program expressly excluded those students studying devotional 
theology.  This program was challenged as violating the free exercise 
rights of potential devotional theology majors.  A strong argument could 
be made that it did.  A similarly strong argument could be made that the 
exception helped protect the establishment concerns held by Washington 
lawmakers and citizens. 
A decision holding the exception to be a violation of free exercise 
rights would have been in line with the Court’s recent trend toward an 
accommodation of religious institutions in receiving public educational 
funding.  This trend culminated in 2002’s Zelman v. Simmons-Harris,7 
which held constitutional an Ohio program allowing parents to use 
publicly funded educational vouchers to send their children to parochial 
schools.  Additionally, such a decision could have found justification in 
the “neutrality principle” the Court has begun to articulate during the last 
fifteen years: the notion that a law may burden free exercise only if it is 
facially neutral in regard to religion.8  The Washington scholarship 
exception may arguably be seen as facially discriminatory. 
The Locke Court, however, in a seven-to-two decision, held that the 
Washington theology exception did not impermissibly burden free 
exercise rights.9  This is a notable decision in several respects.  First, the 
primary dispute between the majority and the dissent reveals a 
fundamental clash in Religion Clause priorities within the Court.  One 
side favors continuing the general trend of accommodation of religion 
into public funding schemes, while the other gives priority to the more 
recent trend of increasing deference to state and local governments in 
resolving church-state controversies.  The Court in recent years has 
 
                                                     
 6. 540 U.S. 712 (2004). 
 7. 536 U.S. 639 (2002). 
 8. See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Haileah, 508 U.S. 520, 546 (1993) 
(holding that statutes burdening free exercise that are not facially neutral are to be subjected to strict 
scrutiny); Employment Div., Dep’t of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 878 (1990) (holding that 
a neutral law of general applicability need not be justified by a compelling state interest); see also 
infra Part II.D. 
 9. Locke, 540 U.S. at 715. 
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shown a willingness to defer to state and local authorities so long as 
minimum requirements of neutrality and general applicability are met.10 
Both the trend of deferring to local governments and the trend of 
accommodating religious groups could comfortably coexist in a case 
such as Zelman, where approving a neutral, generally applicable 
educational program necessarily coincided with giving the state 
government the power to regulate its own affairs.11   In Locke, the two 
trends could not coexist as neatly.  The result in Locke can be explained 
by a majority of the Court giving priority to local and state political 
processes in resolving disputes, rather than adhering to the ideal of 
neutrality or the desire to accommodate religious groups. 
Second, taken together with Zelman, Locke now allows states to 
decide whether religious institutions may participate in state educational 
funding programs.  In other words, Locke finishes creating a zone of state 
and local discretion, a gray area between the religion clauses in which it 
indicates the Supreme Court will not interfere.12  Though the Locke 
Court ostensibly limits its holding to the facts of the case, this zone of 
discretion is easily applied to any matter in which the federal government 
imposes on state and local governments any obligations or restrictions 
which concern a religious issue. 
This Note argues that the Locke decision is, at the least, doctrinally 
sound.  It logically places the case in the same line as other denial-of-
benefit cases, helps to clarify the strictness of the neutrality principle, 
and provides a complement to the Court’s Establishment Clause doctrine.  
Further, it does not seem likely to increase the potential for religious 
discrimination, as the dissent fears.  However, because of the decision’s 
weaknesses—a failure to clearly delineate precisely how far a state may 
stray from strict neutrality and a failure to state its theoretical position as 
precisely as the dissent does—the post-Zelman tide of litigation seeking 
to force equal government funding for parochial education is not 
completely stemmed.  Perhaps more importantly, the Court seems to 
have opened up the floor for more state, rather than federal, litigation in 
the religious arena without precisely setting out the ground rules. 
This Note begins with an examination of various facets of Religion 
Clause jurisprudence, particularly focusing on how the court historically 
has dealt with the tension between the Establishment Clause and the Free 
Exercise Clause.  After a detailed discussion of the case itself, the Note 
                                                     
 10. See infra Parts II, III.A. 
 11. See generally 536 U.S. 639. 
 12. For a more detailed discussion of this zone of discretion, see infra Part III.A. 
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will argue that Locke, in tandem with Zelman, has the effect of 
delegating to state legislatures some of the review authority the Court 
once reserved for itself.  It will explore why the Court seems to be 
shifting away from the emphasis on neutrality underlying recent Religion 
Clause decisions toward a more flexible, decentralized approach; discuss 
the possible ramifications of this shift; and examine post-Locke litigation 
to determine what the decision portends for the immediate future of 
Religion Clause jurisprudence. 
II. BACKGROUND 
A.   Everson: Strict Separation and a Single Reading of the Religion 
Clauses 
The development of Supreme Court jurisprudence regarding the 
required level of state neutrality toward religion reflects the gradual 
recognition that the two clauses should be considered independently, 
notwithstanding the resulting tension between the absolute language of 
the clauses.  This separate consideration has not always been the case.  
Modern Establishment Clause jurisprudence has its genesis in 1947’s 
landmark decision, Everson v. Board of Education.13  Everson held 
constitutional a New Jersey statute authorizing local school boards to 
reimburse parents of parochial school students for public transportation 
expenses.14 
The Everson majority characterized the two religion clauses as 
“interrelated” and “complementary,” and it expressed little trouble in 
reconciling the two: “‘[t]he structure of our government has, for the 
preservation of civil liberty, rescued the temporal institutions from 
religious interference.  On the other hand, it has secured religious liberty 
from the invasion of the civil authority.’”15  The inherent tension 
between the clauses might have gone unrecognized because the New 
Jersey program implicated the Establishment Clause to a greater extent 
than it did the Free Exercise Clause.  A better explanation might be that 
the strict-separation doctrine espoused by the Everson Court did not 
require a reading of the clauses as separate entities.16  Basing the 
                                                     
 13. 330 U.S. 1 (1947). 
 14. Id. at 3. 
 15. Id. at 15 (quoting Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679, 730 (1871)). 
 16. See generally Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 821–22 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting) 
(implying that religious liberty is best guaranteed by Establishment Clause prohibitions); see also 
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discussion largely on the writings of Madison and Jefferson, the Court 
found that the Framers generally intended “a strict wall of separation” 
between church and state.17  Specifically, all nine Justices agreed with 
the majority’s language: 
Neither a state nor the Federal government . . . can pass laws which aid 
one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over another . . . .  
No tax in any amount, large or small, can be levied to support any 
religious activities or institutions, whatever they may be called, or 
whatever form they may adopt to teach or practice religion.18 
It is doubtful, however, that a majority of the Court has ever truly 
followed the strict-separation doctrine.  After its strong declaration of 
principle, the majority in Everson upheld the New Jersey program, 
analogizing the program to public services traditionally provided to 
religious and non-religious institutions alike—police or fire protection, 
for example.19  Though not specifically stated, the impossibility of true 
separation was made evident by the contradictory decision.20 
B.   Accepting Tension and the Rise of Accommodation 
The Religion Clause decisions that followed in the next several 
decades began to explore a more realistic framework with which to 
evaluate government neutrality toward religion.  The majority wrote in 
1952’s Zorach v. Clauson21 that the First Amendment “does not say that 
in every and all respects there shall be a separation of Church and 
State.”22  The Court again noted that such a position would render 
religious institutions incapable of receiving basic public services.23  It 
further warned against allowing church-state relations to become 
“hostile, suspicious, and even unfriendly.”24  Similarly, 1968’s Board of 
                                                                                                                       
Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 232–33 (1963) (stating that protection of religious freedoms 
does not rest solely on either clause). 
 17. Everson, 330 U.S. at 16. 
 18. Id. at 15–16. 
 19. Id. at 17. 
 20. See Joseph P. Viteritti, Davey’s Plea: Blaine, Blair, Witters, and the Protection of Religious 
Freedom, 27 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 299, 326 (2003) (discussing the “jumble of mixed messages” 
set forth in Everson). 
 21. 343 U.S. 306 (1952). 
 22. Id. at 312.  Zorach upheld a state program allowing schoolchildren to be released early to 
attend outside religious education classes. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. 
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Education v. Allen25 explicitly recognized that “religious schools pursue 
two goals, religious instruction and secular education.”26  The Allen court 
refused to endorse the notion that the two goals were “so intertwined that 
secular textbooks furnished to students by the public are in fact 
instrumental in the teaching of religion.”27  This was the first real signal 
that the Court was willing to show any accommodation of parochial 
schools in public funding schemes. 
Two years later, in Walz v. Tax Commission,28 the Court for the first 
time explicitly acknowledged that the difficulty in determining the 
proper level of governmental neutrality stemmed from the difficulty in 
reconciling the absolute language of the two clauses.29  The Court wrote 
that “[t]he considerable internal inconsistency in the [Religion Clause] 
opinions of the Court derives from what . . . may have been too sweeping 
utterances on aspects of these clauses that seemed clear in relation to the 
particular cases but have limited meaning in general principle.”30  The 
Court recognized that a rigid interpretation of the language could subvert 
the purposes of the religion clauses: “to insure that no religion be 
sponsored or favored, none commanded, and none inhibited.”31  In 
holding constitutional a program of tax exemptions for religious 
institutions, the Court wrote, 
we will not tolerate either governmentally established religion or 
governmental interference with religion.  Short of those expressly 
proscribed governmental acts there is room for play in the joints 
productive of a benevolent neutrality which will permit religious 
exercise to exist without sponsorship and without interference.32 
While this concept of “play in the joints” was not heavily drawn 
upon (at least explicitly) in later jurisprudence,33 both the idea of 
“benevolent neutrality” and the concept of inherent tension between the 
clauses featured prominently in later decisions. 
                                                     
 25. 392 U.S. 236 (1968). 
 26. Id. at 245.  Allen upheld a New York program in which parochial schools were lent 
textbooks by public schools. 
 27. Id. at 248. 
 28. 397 U.S. 664 (1970). 
 29. Id. at 668–69. 
 30. Id. at 668. 
 31. Id. at 669. 
 32. Id.   
 33. Between 1971 (Walz) and 2004 (Locke) the Supreme Court cited the concept of “play in the 
joints” in the Religion Clause context only four times.  Bd. of Ed. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687 (1994); 
County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573 (1989); Sloan v. Lemon, 413 U.S. 825 (1973); 
Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455 (1973). 
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C.   Establishment and Accommodation: From Lemon to Zelman 
The idea that the state should act with benevolent neutrality toward 
religion gave rise to a growing willingness to accommodate religious 
institutions in general public programs.  The rise and fall of the neutrality 
test first set forth in 1971’s Lemon v. Kurtzman34 demonstrates this 
growing accommodationist trend.  Lemon reiterated that “total separation 
[of church and state] is not possible in an absolute sense.”35  Lemon 
proposed a three-prong test to use in evaluating whether a statute 
violated the Establishment Clause: “First, the statute must have a secular 
legislative purpose; second, its principal or primary effect must be one 
that neither advances nor inhibits religion; finally, the statute must not 
foster ‘an excessive government entanglement with religion.’”36 
In its initial appearance, the test was rigidly applied.  Lemon held 
unconstitutional two state statutes that granted some state funds to 
supplement the salaries of parochial school teachers of secular subjects.  
The majority found that “the very restrictions and surveillance necessary 
to ensure that teachers play a strictly non-ideological role give rise to 
entanglements between church and state.”37  For the next decade the 
Court’s focus in this area shifted to the potential divertibility of public 
funds.  That is, the Court primarily upheld programs where little 
monitoring was required to ensure that state funds would not be used for 
religious purposes, and it struck down programs where substantial 
monitoring was required.38 
The inherent flexibility in interpreting the prongs of the Lemon test, 
however, opened up opportunities for a majority with a more 
accommodationist view of religion.  In 1983’s Mueller v. Allen, the 
Court upheld a program allowing parents of parochial school children to 
                                                     
 34. 403 U.S. 602 (1971). 
 35. Id. at 614. 
 36. Id. at 612–13 (quoting Walz, 397 U.S. at 674)).  The first two prongs of the Lemon test were 
drawn from School District v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 222 (1963). 
 37. Id. at 620–21. 
 38. See, e.g., Roemer v. Bd. of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736 (1976) (holding constitutional a state 
grant program to private and religious universities, where a strict program was in place); Levitt v. 
Comm. for Public Educ. & Religious Liberty, 413 U.S. 472 (1973) (holding unconstitutional 
reimbursement to religious schools for mandatory school testing); Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 
672 (1971) (holding constitutional federal building grants to church-run colleges and universities); 
see also Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 691–92 (2002) (Souter, J., dissenting) (“To 
avoid . . . entanglement, the Court’s focus in the post-[Board of Education v.] Allen cases was on the 
principle of divertibility.”). 
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take a tax deduction for tuition and expenses.39  The factual situation in 
Mueller was nearly identical to Committee for Public Education & 
Religious Liberty v. Nyquist,40 decided a decade earlier.  In Nyquist, the 
Court held that such a program violated the “principal or primary effect” 
prong of the Lemon test.41  This was because of “the absence of an 
effective means of guaranteeing that the state aid derived from public 
funds will be used exclusively for secular, neutral, and nonideological 
purposes.”42  The Court in Mueller distinguished and upheld a similar 
program, placing special emphasis on the fact that the tax deduction was 
one of many offered to Minnesota citizens for a variety of purposes, 
including medical expenses and charitable contributions.43  The Court 
also relied on the fact that the Mueller program, unlike the Nyquist 
program, was available to parents of all schoolchildren, not just those 
attending non-public schools.44 
While important as a signal that the Court found Lemon a less-than-
useful tool in determining Establishment Clause violations, Mueller more 
importantly marked a turning point for the Court’s treatment of 
establishment issues.  The cases that followed in the next few decades 
began increasingly to allow for state aid to religious schools by 
emphasizing “neutral availability for religious and secular educational 
expenses and the role of private choice.”45  Witters v. Washington 
Department of Services for the Blind46 exemplifies this line of cases.  
Witters approved a blind student’s use of a state-funded vocational 
training subsidy to be used at a religious college.47  The Witters Court 
emphasized that “[a]ny aid provided under Washington’s program that 
ultimately flows to religious institutions does so only as the result of the 
                                                     
 39. 463 U.S. 388 (1983). 
 40. 413 U.S. 756 (1973). 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. at 780. 
 43. Mueller, 463 U.S. at 396. 
 44. Id. at 397. 
 45. Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 694 (2002) (Souter, J., dissenting).  See, e.g., 
Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997) (holding that a state program paying remedial teachers of 
secular subjects to teach in parochial schools was constitutional and finding it sufficient that public 
aid to parochial schools supplemented but did not supplant existing educational services); 
Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819 (1995) (holding 
unconstitutional a ban on allowing student religious organizations access to a general student activity 
fund and emphasizing the neutrality of the program and the role of individual choice); Zobrest v. 
Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1 (1993) (upholding a deaf parochial student’s use of a 
generally funded program to hire a sign language interpreter and emphasizing the neutral nature of 
the program and the role of private choice in use of funds). 
 46. 474 U.S. 481 (1986). 
 47. Id. 
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genuinely independent and private choices of aid recipients.”48  Also 
central to the decisions was that the aid was “‘made available generally 
without regard to the sectarian-nonsectarian, or public-nonpublic nature 
of the institution benefited,’ and [was] in no way skewed towards 
religion.”49 
This increasingly accommodationist line of cases reached its apogee 
in 2002’s Zelman v. Simmons-Harris.50  Zelman held constitutional an 
Ohio program allowing parents of children residing in under-performing 
school districts to receive state funds toward tuition at the public or 
private school of their choice, including parochial schools.51  The Court 
first found that the program had a valid secular purpose: “providing 
educational assistance to poor children in a demonstrably failing public 
school system.”52  Relying on Mueller, Witters, and Zobrest v. Catalina 
Foothills School District,53 the Court held, 
where a government aid program is neutral with respect to religion, and 
provides assistance directly to a broad class of citizens who, in turn, 
direct government aid to religious schools wholly as a result of their 
own genuine and independent private choice, the program is not readily 
subject to challenge under the Establishment Clause.54 
The Court further held that whether the majority of funds would 
inevitably reach religious institutions was constitutionally irrelevant.55  In 
a concurring opinion, Justice O’Connor reconciled the holding with 
Everson, arguing that a fair reading of Everson clarifies the notion that 
governmental programs that aid religious education must flow through 
the hands of the individual recipients.56  Everson, after all, did uphold the 
transportation reimbursement program.57  Zelman represents the current 
state of Establishment Clause jurisprudence as it relates to public 
educational funding. 
                                                     
 48. Id. at 487. 
 49. Id. at 487–88 (quoting Comm. for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 
756, 782–83, n.38 (1973)). 
 50. 536 U.S. 639. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. at 649. 
 53. 509 U.S. 1. 
 54. Zelman, 536 U.S. at 652. 
 55. Id. at 658. 
 56. Id. at 669–70 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 57. Id. at 670. 
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D. Free Exercise, Smith, and Lukumi 
The general trend in Establishment Clause jurisprudence toward 
accommodation of religion parallels a similar trend in Free Exercise 
jurisprudence.  This trend is largely due to the interconnected nature of 
the two clauses.  Taking Walz as an example, when the exemption from a 
general taxation statute is granted to a religious institution without 
violating the Establishment Clause, a potential burden on the free 
exercise of that institution correspondingly is removed.  A second trend, 
however, has manifested itself in free exercise jurisprudence in the last 
fifteen years—namely, greater flexibility in allowing state and local 
political processes to resolve potential burdens placed on religious 
exercise by generally applicable laws. 
For decades, the test set forth in 1963’s Sherbert v. Verner58 
remained the standard by which impermissible governmental burden of 
free exercise was evaluated.  Sherbert held that a person discharged from 
a job because of a refusal to work on the Sabbath could not be denied 
unemployment benefits.59  Rather than merely allowing states to argue an 
advancement of secular goals, Sherbert held that “any incidental burden 
on the free exercise of [an individual’s] religion may be justified by a 
‘compelling state interest in the regulation of a subject within the 
[s]tate’s Constitutional power to regulate.’”60  This compelling state 
interest test was a strict one: “no showing merely of a rational 
relationship to a colorable state interest would suffice; in this highly 
sensitive constitutional area, ‘only the gravest abuses, endangering 
paramount interests, give occasion for permissible limitation.’”61  The 
state wishing to limit free expression would be required “to demonstrate 
that no alternative forms of regulation” were available to advance the 
asserted state interest “without infringing First Amendment rights.”62 
The Sherbert test, with its implied distrust of local political processes 
in protecting free exercise rights, was applied over the next several 
decades in cases involving denial of unemployment benefits,63 as well as 
                                                     
 58. 374 U.S. 398 (1963). 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. at 403 (quoting NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438 (1963)). 
 61. Id. at 406 (quoting Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530 (1945)). 
 62. Id. at 407. 
 63. See, e.g., Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm’n, 480 U.S. 136 (1987) (holding that 
Florida’s denial of unemployment compensation to an individual fired for refusing to work on the 
Sabbath violated her First Amendment right); Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707 (1981) (holding 
that Indiana’s denial of unemployment compensation to an individual who quit his job because his 
religious beliefs prevented him from making war materials violated his First Amendment right). 
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in a variety of other fields.64  The preeminence of the Sherbert test, as 
well as the Court’s corresponding requirement of what later was 
characterized as “strict scrutiny”65 of the compelling state interest in 
burdening free exercise, was transformed by 1990’s Employment 
Division, Department of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith.66  The 
Court by a five-to-four majority reversed the Oregon Supreme Court, 
which had held that the denial of unemployment benefits to persons 
discharged as a result of a religious use of peyote violated the Free 
Exercise Clause.67  Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, made the 
following statement: 
The only decisions in which [the Court has] held that the First 
Amendment bars application of a neutral, generally applicable law to 
religiously motivated action have involved not the Free Exercise Clause 
alone, but the Free Exercise Clause in conjunction with other 
constitutional protections, such as freedom of speech and of the press.68 
The majority then held the Sherbert compelling interest test 
inapplicable to free exercise analysis.69  According to the majority, the 
Court had only three times used the Sherbert test to invalidate 
unemployment rules that “conditioned . . . benefits upon an applicant’s 
willingness to work under conditions forbidden by his religion.”70  
Further, the Court had “never invalidated any governmental action on the 
basis of Sherbert” in other contexts.71  The Court found Sherbert 
inapplicable to criminal law in general,72 and held that the compelling 
state interest test was completely inapplicable to free exercise 
jurisprudence.73  The Court asserted that the use of the compelling state 
interest test, while applicable to other constitutional areas such as racial 
discrimination or free speech, “is not remotely comparable . . . for the 
                                                     
 64. See, e.g., United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982) (holding that the government’s interest 
in collecting social security tax outweighed the burden placed on an Amish farmer with a religious 
objection to payment of the tax); Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437 (1971) (holding the 
government’s use of a military draft to be a compelling state interest outweighing burdening 
conscientious objectors’ religious beliefs). 
 65. See, e.g., Hobbie, 480 U.S. at 141 (noting that case law, including Sherbert, required that 
indirect infringements on religious liberty be subjected to strict scrutiny). 
 66. 494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. at 881. 
 69. Id. at 882–86. 
 70. Id. at 883. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. at 884. 
 73. Id. at 885–86. 
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purpose asserted here.  What it produces in those other fields—equality 
of treatment and an unrestricted flow of contending speech—are 
constitutional norms; what it would produce here—a private right to 
ignore generally applicable laws—is a constitutional anomaly.”74  After 
Smith, facially neutral laws that burden religious practice need not be 
justified by a compelling governmental interest if they are of general 
applicability.  The essence of this “neutrality principle,” in its strictest 
conception, is that neutral laws that incidentally burden religion are 
constitutionally acceptable under the Free Exercise Clause.75 
Smith’s new neutrality principle understandably threw free exercise 
jurisprudence into confusion, and many observers worried that the 
Court’s newly minted deference to state legislatures indicated a 
willingness to accept a state’s assertion of neutrality at face value.76  
Three years later, Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of 
Hialeah77 clarified the Court’s new standard of free exercise review.  The 
case involved a community that had banned ritual sacrifice of animals in 
response to an influx of practitioners of Santeria, a religious group whose 
rites included such ritual sacrifice.78  While reaffirming the Smith 
standard, the Court in Lukumi emphasized that “the minimum 
requirement of neutrality is that a law not discriminate on its face.”79  
The Court went further, demonstrating a willingness to examine the 
actual effect of a statute and to examine the legislative record to 
determine whether the enactment of the statute was motivated by the 
intent to suppress a particular religious belief.80  Noting that the Free 
Exercise Clause “‘forbids subtle departure from neutrality’ and ‘covert 
suppression of particular religious beliefs,’”81 the Court held that “[a] law 
burdening religious practice that is not neutral or of general application 
                                                     
 74. Id. at 886. 
 75. See id. at 878 (discussing the validity of a tax that only incidentally prohibits the exercise of 
religion).  The Establishment Clause parallel to this free-exercise neutrality principle can be seen in 
the Zelman decision; that is, neutral laws that incidentally burden religion are constitutionally 
acceptable under the Establishment Clause.  Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 652 (2002).  
Thus, the neutrality principle might be stated in this way: neutral, generally applicable laws which 
incidentally benefit or burden religious exercise are constitutionally permissible under both clauses. 
 76. See, e.g., Michael W. McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism and the Smith Decision, 57 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 1109, 1133 (1990) (discussing Smith’s characterization of generally applicable laws as 
presumptively neutral). 
 77. 508 U.S. 520 (1993). 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. at 533. 
 80. Id. at 534–35. 
 81. Id. at 534 (quoting respectively Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437, 452 (1971); Bowen 
v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 703 (1986)). 
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must undergo the most rigorous of scrutiny.”82  Lukumi thus appeared to 
reaffirm the Court’s commitment to the neutrality principle stated in 
Smith, but at the same time to reaffirm its commitment to protection in 
cases of obvious religious discrimination.83 
E.   Locke v. Davey 
1. Factual and Procedural Background 
In late 2003, the Supreme Court heard arguments in a case 
considered vitally important by both opponents and proponents of 
allowing public funds to be used for religious education purposes.84  
Zelman had cleared the way to allow state educational funding schemes 
to include religious schools, but the question remained whether such 
inclusion was mandatory. 
The Washington State Legislature established the Promise 
Scholarship Program,85 which allowed Washington high-school seniors 
who met eligibility requirements to receive a two-year, post-secondary 
scholarship.86  These eligibility requirements included academic, income, 
and enrollment requirements.87  The enrollment requirements provided 
that the scholarship money could not be used for students pursuing a 
                                                     
 82. Id. at 546. 
 83. See, e.g., Stephen L. Carter, The Resurrection of Religious Freedom?, 107 HARV. L. REV. 
118, 141 (1993) (arguing that after the Court’s seeming abandonment of free exercise protection in 
Smith, Lukumi suggests that “the Supreme Court is willing, at a minimum, to set aside efforts to 
make religions suffer special penalties that secular organizations do not”).  But see Renee Skinner, 
The Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah: Still Sacrificing Free Exercise, 46 
BAYLOR L. REV. 259, 277 (1994) (arguing that Lukumi merely limits a further expansion of the 
Smith doctrine, but does not fundamentally affect Smith’s consequences).  Additionally, an obvious 
parallel exists with the Court’s willingness to protect against racial discrimination where provable 
“discriminatory intent” exists.  See, e.g., Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 240–41 (1976) 
(holding that “the invidious quality of a law claimed to be racially discriminatory must ultimately be 
traced to a racially discriminatory purpose,” but that this does not necessarily imply that “the 
necessary discriminatory racial purpose must be express or appear on the face of the statute.”). 
 84. See Linda Greenhouse, Justices Resist Religious Study Using Subsidies, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 
3, 2003, at A1. 
 85. Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 715 (2004). 
 86. Id. at 715–16. 
 87. The eligibility requirements stated, 
[a] student must graduate from a Washington public or private high school and either 
1,200 graduate in the top 15% of his graduating class, or attain on the first attempt a 
cumulative score of or better on the Scholastic Assessment Test I, or a score of 27 or 
better on the American College Test.  The student’s family income must be less than 
135% of the State’s median.  Finally, the student must enroll at least half-time in an 
eligible postsecondary institution in the state of Washington. 
Id. at 716 (internal quotations and citations omitted). 
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degree in theology.88  Although the statute did not explicitly define “a 
degree in theology,” both parties in the case conceded that “the statute 
simply codifies the State’s constitutional provision on providing funds to 
students to pursue degrees that are devotional in nature or designed to 
induce religious faith.”89 
Joshua Davey was a Promise Scholarship recipient who enrolled in 
Northwest College, “a private, Christian college affiliated with the 
Assemblies of God denomination, and . . . an eligible institution under 
the Promise Scholarship Program.”90  Davey intended to pursue a double 
major in business management/administration and pastoral ministries, 
with the specific object of training for a religious ministry.91  He was 
denied his scholarship funds when he refused to certify that he was not 
using the funds to pursue a degree in devotional theology.92 
Davey filed a federal civil rights action in the District Court for the 
Western Division of Washington under 42 U.S.C. § 198393 seeking both 
damages and to enjoin the State from refusing him his scholarship 
funds.94  Davey alleged that the State of Washington violated “the Free 
Exercise, Establishment, and Free Speech Clause of the First 
Amendment.”95  The district court refused to grant an injunction and 
granted summary judgment in favor of the State.96 
A divided panel of the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s 
grant of summary judgment on appeal, holding that “the State had 
singled out religion for unfavorable treatment and thus under . . . Church 
of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah, the State’s exclusion of 
theology majors must be narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling state 
interest.”97  Rejecting Washington’s antiestablishment claims as 
 
                                                     
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. (internal quotations omitted). 
 90. Id. at 717. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. 
 93. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000) authorizes a civil action for deprivation of rights against every 
person “who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or 
Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United 
States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or 
immunities secured by the Constitution and laws.” 
 94. Davey v. Locke, No. C00-61R, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22273, at *4 (W.D. Wash. Oct. 5, 
2000), rev’d, 299 F.3d 748 (9th Cir. 2002), rev’d, 540 U.S. 712 (2004). 
 95. Locke, 540 U.S. at 718. 
 96. Davey, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22273, at *4, *26. 
 97. Locke, 540 U.S. at 718 (citation omitted). 
GAUS FINAL.DOC 4/15/2006  10:46:22 AM 
2006] LOCKE V. DAVEY AND THE NEW FREE EXERCISE 567 
uncompelling, the appellate court held the Promise Scholarship Program 
unconstitutional.98 
2. Majority Opinion 
Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the seven-justice majority, began 
by noting that the Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause are 
frequently in tension, but that there is, as the Court had previously noted 
in Walz v. Tax Commission, “some room for play in the joints” between 
the two clauses.99  The majority first dismissed the Establishment Clause 
issue, noting that should Washington’s program not wish to exclude 
theology students, this would be constitutionally permissible after 
Zelman,100 as the link between government funds and religious training 
was broken by individual choice of the recipient.101 
Turning to the free exercise issue,102 the majority dismissed the 
argument that, after Lukumi,103 the Washington program was not facially 
neutral and therefore was presumptively unconstitutional and subject to 
the strictest scrutiny.104  The majority first noted that any potential 
discrimination by the Promise Scholarship Program or the State of 
Washington would be of a much milder kind than in Lukumi, which 
imposed criminal sanctions on Santeria practitioners and essentially 
denied them a political voice in the community.105  The exclusion of 
theology majors from the Promise Scholarship program was 
characterized as a “State merely [choosing] not to fund a distinct 
category of instruction.”106 
The majority then addressed Justice Scalia’s dissent.  Justice Scalia 
argued that because Washington chose to fund training for all secular 
professions, it had to do so for religious professions as well; the majority 
held this reasoning to be flawed for several reasons.107  First, the majority 
was not willing to accept the contention that religious education and 
secular education were at all equivalent.  The two types of education are 
                                                     
 98. Davey, 299 F.3d at 760. 
 99. Locke, 540 U.S. at 718 (citing Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 397 U.S. 664, 669 (1970)). 
 100. Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 652 (2002). 
 101. Locke, 540 U.S. at 719. 
 102. Davey’s free speech argument was dismissed in a footnote: “the Promise Scholarship 
Program is not a forum for speech.”  Id. at 720 n.3. 
 103. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993). 
 104. Locke, 540 U.S. at 720. 
 105. Id. at 720–21. 
 106. Id. at 721. 
 107. Id. 
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simply “not fungible,” one major distinction being that “majoring in 
devotional theology is akin to a religious calling as well as an academic 
pursuit.”108  Second, the court examined the motive behind the statutory 
exclusion, concluding that Washington’s choice to treat religious 
education separately was a product of traditional views on religion—“in 
favor of free exercise, but opposed to establishment”—rather than 
evidence of any hostility or animus toward religion.109 
The majority then turned briefly to the historical background of the 
Establishment Clause, particularly noting popular uprisings against using 
taxes to fund church leaders, and that many states, prior to the enactment 
of the Constitution, had provisions in their state constitutions forbidding 
using public funds to support clergy.110  Early state governments had no 
problem preventing churches alone from receiving state funds, and thus, 
historically, there existed a substantial state interest in states preventing 
the funding of religion or of religious education.111 
The majority further distinguished the facts of Lukumi from the 
Promise Scholarship Program: “Far from the hostility towards religion 
which was manifest in Lukumi, we believe that the entirety of the 
Promise Scholarship Program goes a long way towards including 
religion in its benefits.”112  This inclusion was evidenced by the ability of 
Promise Scholars to attend predominantly religious schools.  The Court 
also noted that the program allowed students to take devotional theology 
courses—they simply could not pursue degrees in devotional theology.113 
The majority concluded that, given the historical and substantial state 
interest in preventing public funds from reaching religion or religious 
education, coupled with the slight burden placed on Davey, “[i]f any 
room exists between the two religion clauses, it must be here.”114  The 
Court thus reversed the decision of the Ninth Circuit.115 
3. Dissent 
Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Thomas, dissented from the majority 
opinion.  The dissent opened by invoking the general agreement in 
                                                     
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. at 722–23. 
 111. Id. at 723. 
 112. Id. at 724. 
 113. Id. at 724–25. 
 114. Id. at 725. 
 115. Id. 
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Lukumi that “‘formal neutrality’ is a ‘necessary conditio[n] for free-
exercise constitutionality,’” and argued that the majority opinion could 
not be reconciled with that statement.116 
Justice Scalia argued that the principle governing the case reached 
back to Everson, particularly the language holding that a state “‘cannot 
exclude . . . members of any . . . faith, because of their faith, or lack of it, 
from receiving the benefits of public welfare legislation.’”117  Justice 
Scalia characterized the Promise Scholarship Program as such a public 
welfare legislation program, arguing that 
[w]hen a state makes a public benefit generally available, that benefit 
becomes part of the baseline against which burdens on religion are 
measured; and when the State withholds that benefit from some 
individuals solely on the basis of religion, it violates the Free Exercise 
Clause no less than if it had imposed a special tax.118 
In Justice Scalia’s view, Davey was not asking for special treatment, but 
merely equal treatment: he wanted to be allowed to do what all other 
Promise Scholars were allowed to do.119 
The discussion of public benefit programs was further employed to 
distinguish the majority’s historical argument: the case did not involve 
laws singling out ministers for benefits, rather it involved public benefit 
programs generally available to a broad segment of the population.120  
Justice Scalia conceded the Framers’ hostility to specifically funding 
religion, but he argued that this did not necessarily mean they were 
hostile to allowing ministers to take part in general publicly funded 
programs—using public roads on the way to church, for example.121 
Justice Scalia then attacked the majority’s reliance on “play in the 
joints” as a spurious concept, drawing an analogy to racial discrimination 
cases: 
                                                     
 116. Id. at 726 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting Church of  the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. 
Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 546, 563 (1993)). 
 117. Id. (quoting Everson v. Bd. of Ed., 330 U.S. 1, 16 (1947)). 
 118. Id. at 726–27.  But see the Court’s characterization of other denial-of-benefit cases in 
Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 464 (1977) (noting the substantial distinction between a denial of 
benefits that would ease the exercise of a right and a direct burden on the right itself), and Sullivan v. 
Rust, 500 U.S. 173, 173 (1991) (characterizing a denial of welfare benefits conditioned on 
nondiscussion of abortion as merely a matter of governmental funding priorities), as discussed infra 
notes 159–63 and accompanying text. 
 119. Locke, 540 U.S. at 727 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 120. Id. 
 121. Id. at 727–28. 
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A municipality hiring public contractors may not discriminate against 
blacks or in favor of  them; it cannot discriminate a little bit each way 
and plead “play in the joints” when haled into court.  If the Religion 
Clauses demand neutrality, we must enforce them, in hard cases as well 
as easy ones.122 
In any event, he argued, play in the joints, even if valid, should only be 
used in close cases, and the unanimous decision in Witters clearly 
showed that this case was not close.123  Should the majority insist on 
some play in the joints, there were any number of ways the Promise 
Scholarship Program could be held nondiscriminatory: Washington 
could make the scholarship redeemable only at public universities, where 
the State set the curriculum; it could make the scholarship redeemable 
only for select courses of study; or it could end the program entirely.124 
Justice Scalia then questioned the nature of the asserted State interest 
itself, first classifying it as so broadly defined that “it would be offended 
by a program with such an incidental, indirect religious effect.”125  He 
then classified the state interest as “a pure philosophical preference” that 
the citizens of Washington would somehow have their freedom of 
conscience violated by allowing theology students to share in the 
scholarship program.126  He noted that such a choice logically could be 
extended to exclude religion from any state program whatsoever, and 
pointed out that such an interest was, in any event, not classified by the 
majority as compelling, as “the [majority] opinion is devoid of any 
mention of standard of review.”127 
The heart of the dissent was Justice Scalia’s contention that “[t]he 
Court makes no serious attempt to defend the program’s neutrality, and 
instead identifies two features thought to render its discrimination less 
offensive;” that is, by pointing out the lightness of Davey’s burden and 
the lack of any motive for the Washington Legislature to discriminate.128  
In the dissent’s view, the majority was imposing some sort of “threshold 
quantum-of-harm requirement” on a case involving a statute arguably 
discriminatory on its face, which, it was noted, had never been the 
Court’s policy in deciding cases involving other types of 
                                                     
 122. Id. at 728. 
 123. Id. at 729. 
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. 
 126. Id. at 730. 
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. at 731. 
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discrimination.129  Further, even if there were a threshold, it had clearly 
been met—the forfeiture of an otherwise available $3000 scholarship 
benefit.130 
Regarding the lack of motive by the state legislature to discriminate, 
Justice Scalia argued that motive was irrelevant.  “If a State deprives a 
citizen of trial by jury or passes an ex post facto law, we do not pause to 
investigate whether it was actually trying to accomplish the evil the 
Constitution prohibits.  It is sufficient that the citizen’s rights have been 
infringed.”131  According to Scalia, when the Court declared racial 
segregation to be unconstitutional, it did not inquire whether the 
legislature, in passing segregation statutes, was motivated by a “well-
meaning but misguided belief that the races would be better off apart.”132  
Moving away from analogy, the dissent discussed McDaniel v. Paty,133 
noting that when the Court invalidated a statute prohibiting members of 
the clergy from sitting in the state legislature, it took the good intentions 
of the state legislature at face value—but still invalidated the statute.134 
Justice Scalia concluded by arguing that the majority’s rationale 
could be extended indefinitely, to the point of denying priests and nuns 
prescription drug benefits, or banning religious garb in school, as the 
French recently did.135  “When the public’s freedom of conscience is 
invoked to justify denial of equal treatment, benevolent motives shade 
into indifference and ultimately into repression.  Having accepted the 
justification in this case, the Court is less well equipped to fend it off in 
the future.”136 
Justice Thomas concurred in Justice Scalia’s dissent and added his 
own short postscript.  He wrote that, because the parties both agreed that 
“degree in theology,” as used in the statute meant specifically “a degree 
in devotional theology,” rather than in theology in general (which may 
contain nonreligious elements), Justice Scalia’s application of precedent 
was correct.137  He implied that the reasoning might have been different 
had “degree in theology” been construed to encompass this wider 
definition.138 
                                                     
 129. Id. 
 130. Id. 
 131. Id. at 732. 
 132. Id. 
 133. 435 U.S. 618 (1978). 
 134. Locke, 540 U.S. at 733 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 135. Id. at 734. 
 136. Id. 
 137. Id. at 734–35 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 138. Id. 
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III. ANALYSIS 
A.   Locke and the Zone of State and Local Discretion 
The Supreme Court’s ultimate decision in Locke v. Davey, or at least 
the lopsided nature of the decision, came to some observers as a 
surprise.139  Given the two-decade general trend allowing state 
educational funds to flow to religious institutions, it would not have been 
surprising had the Court continued this trend and ruled for Davey.  
Additionally, one of Justice Scalia’s stated objectives in the Smith 
decision was to avoid carving out religious exceptions to neutral, 
generally applicable statutes.140  Further, the baseline requirement to pass 
free exercise muster thus seems to be that the statute in question be 
facially neutral, and Lukumi’s holding that a generally applicable law 
which discriminates against a particular religion should be subjected to 
strict scrutiny seems to imply that discrimination concerns would, at the 
least, have played a greater role in the majority’s reasoning. 
These Establishment Clause trends should not, however, obscure an 
equally important trend.  The general trend in free exercise jurisprudence 
has been a journey from Sherbert’s restrictive compelling interest test to 
Smith’s willingness to trust state and local political processes in assessing 
neutrality concerns.  Until Locke, the Establishment Clause 
accommodationist trend was able to coexist with the Free Exercise 
Clause trend providing state and local discretion. 
Zelman provides a case in point.  Ultimately, Zelman, in the words of 
Justice Thomas, “allow[s] States greater latitude in dealing with matters 
of religion and education.”141  Zelman allows states to choose to allow 
public funds to reach religious schools, subject to few provisos: that the 
plan be neutral as regards religion; that the plan benefit a broad class of 
citizens; and that the dispersal of funds ultimately involve private, 
                                                     
 139. See, e.g., Rob Boston, Supreme Victory: High Court Thwarts Religious Right Scheme to 
Require State Funding for Religion, CHURCH & ST., Apr., 2004, at 4 (expressing surprise at the 
result in Locke, given the quick disposal of the case and the makeup of the Court); Mike McKee, 
Justices Say States May Deny Theology Scholarship Funds, LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, Feb. 27, 2004, 
at 4 (expressing surprise at the lopsided Locke decision).  But see Ira C. Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle, 
Hitting the Wall: Religion is Still Special Under the Constitution, Says the High Court, LEGAL 
TIMES, Mar. 15, 2004, at 68 (arguing that the Locke decision is “no great surprise,” given that the 
majority was comprised of a combination of justices with a history of supporting either a stricter 
church-state separation or a greater freedom of states from federal oversight). 
 140. See Employment Div., Dep’t of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 882 (1990) (declining 
to hold that if otherwise prohibited conduct is accompanied by religious convictions the conduct is 
protected). 
 141. Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 680 (2002) (Thomas, J., concurring). 
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individual choice.142  In other words, the Zelman Court established a 
minimum threshold for an education aid program.  This naturally leads to 
the implication that, once the threshold is met, federal constitutional 
muster is passed.  By declining to intervene, the Court necessarily 
affords states great discretion as to how to administer and monitor such 
funding programs.  The direction and uses of educational funds are now 
largely the province of state legislatures and court systems.  By reducing 
its Establishment Clause concerns to the minimum guidelines set out in 
Zelman, the implication arises that litigation within the guidelines is 
likely to be resolved by state law.  In essence, the states become the new 
arbiters of Establishment Clause doctrine, at least as it relates to 
educational funding. 
When viewed in this context, Locke seems less a surprising reversal 
of the accommodationist trend than it does a continuation of the Court’s 
trend toward allowing greater state freedom in balancing the religious 
concerns of their own citizens.  In the words of one observer, “[r]ead 
together, Zelman and Locke show significant deference to [state] 
legislatures . . . the first by permitting them to fund religious instruction; 
the second by permitting them not to.”143  To the majority, Locke is less a 
step away from insuring the government’s neutrality between religion 
and secularism, and more a policy of affording state and local political 
processes a greater say in public religion funding. 
The Court in Locke did not explicitly abandon the neutrality 
requirement, but it certainly stepped away from a more formalistic, 
absolute rule of strict neutrality.  The Locke decision can be seen as the 
result of a dispute over priorities.  Justices Scalia and Thomas assign 
priority to maintaining the strictness of the no-exceptions neutrality 
standard set forth in Smith.144  The majority, while not abandoning this 
standard, instead places priority on state and local discretion.145  In a 
sense, the majority creates a mirror image of Zelman.  Where Zelman 
allows an exception from a general burden to pass muster under the 
Establishment Clause,146 Locke allows an exception from a general 
benefit to pass muster under the Free Exercise Clause.147 
                                                     
 142. Id. at 652 (majority opinion). 
 143. Richard C. Schragger, The Role of the Local in the Doctrine and Discourse of Religious 
Liberty, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1810, 1865 (2004). 
 144. Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 731 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 145. See id. at 712 (majority opinion) (refusing to agree with the argument that the program was 
unconstitutional because it was not facially neutral). 
 146. Zelman, 536 U.S. at 640. 
 147. See Locke, 540 U.S. at 731 (holding that excluding scholarship eligibility for pursuit of 
theology degree is constitutional). 
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Taken in conjunction with Zelman, Locke establishes a zone of state 
and local discretion in publicly funding religious education.  Within this 
zone reside cases in which there exists room for play in the joints 
between the clauses.  While the majority purports to limit its holding to 
the case at hand, Locke nonetheless has enormous implications.  First, 
regardless of the actual scope of the holding, the Court’s methodology 
used in reaching the holding implicates a number of recent doctrinal 
developments—including the Court’s reluctance to apply Lukumi’s strict 
scrutiny standard or to rely heavily on Smith’s neutrality requirement.  
Second, even if the Locke decision is intended to apply solely within the 
sphere of religious education, a cursory glance at the last half-century of 
Religion Clause jurisprudence demonstrates the inseparability of 
religious education controversies and general church-state controversies.  
For example, Everson—ostensibly a religious education case—has 
informed areas as wide-ranging as unemployment benefits148 and the 
public display of religious symbols.149  Similarly, the rationale behind 
Smith—ostensibly an unemployment benefit case—has been extended to 
inform education cases like Zelman. 
In light of Locke’s importance, several questions in particular 
deserve exploration.  Does the Court’s new emphasis on state and local 
discretion better serve the purposes of the religion clauses, particularly in 
regard to discrimination?  How, exactly, is the majority’s reasoning to be 
applied, and what is the extent of this zone of discretion?  Finally, how 
have post-Locke cases employed Locke’s holdings, and what trends for 
future litigation do such uses hold? 
B. The Potential for Discrimination 
1. Standards for Determining Locke’s Burden Requirement 
Any discussion of the effect of Locke on discrimination must begin 
with an examination of the standards used by the majority and dissent to 
evaluate the discrimination suffered, if any, by Davey.  Davey claimed 
(and the dissent agreed)150 that Washington was burdening his free 
exercise rights by denying him access to a general state benefit program 
                                                     
 148. See, e.g., Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 410 (1963) (reaffirming Everson’s principle that 
the nature of one’s faith is not a proper ground for denying public welfare legislation). 
 149. See, e.g., County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 591 (1989) (affirming Everson’s 
summary of the basic principles behind Religion Clause jurisprudence). 
 150. Locke, 540 U.S. at 727 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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solely on the basis of his religious beliefs.151  The majority, however, 
characterized the burdening of Davey’s rights as de minimis, if indeed 
they were burdened at all.152  Davey was not subject to criminal or civil 
penalties, forced to choose between abandoning his religion and 
receiving his scholarship, or prevented from using the scholarship at a 
Christian university.  Whether Washington’s actions amounted to 
discrimination, then, rests on the standard used to evaluate the nature of a 
free exercise burden. 
One obvious parallel, and the one most heavily drawn on by Justice 
Scalia, is that of discrimination that violates the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s equal protection guarantees.  Justice Scalia found it 
astonishing that the majority seemed to accept even a modicum of 
discrimination as acceptable.153  Citing, among other cases, Brown v. 
Board of Education,154 he wrote that “[t]he indignity of being singled out 
for special burdens on the basis of one’s religious calling is so profound 
that the concrete harm produced can never be dismissed as insubstantial.  
The Court has not required proof of ‘substantial’ concrete harm with 
other forms of discrimination.”155  He further argued that consideration 
of potential motivations, including animus toward religion, was 
completely misplaced, noting that in race discrimination cases the Court 
did not pause to consider whether segregation laws may have been well-
meaning.156 
This argument, if one finds persuasive the parallel between equal 
protection and religious discrimination cases, is quite persuasive.  The 
argument becomes even more attractive because of the majority’s failure 
to directly acknowledge it.  This is one of the great weaknesses of the 
majority’s opinion, as is its failure to explicitly suggest another paradigm 
by which to evaluate the nature of Davey’s burden.  Had the majority 
chosen to address the dissent’s argument, it would have had ample 
precedent with which to contest Justice Scalia’s contention. 
One possible parallel, for example, can be drawn to abortion rights.  
The Court wrote in Maher v. Roe that “Roe [v. Wade] did not declare an 
unqualified ‘constitutional right to an abortion’ . . . .  Rather, the right 
protects the woman from unduly burdensome interference with her 
                                                     
 151. Id. at 718 (majority opinion). 
 152. Id. at 725. 
 153. See id. at 731 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that religious discrimination on the face of a 
statute cannot be insubstantial). 
 154. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 155. Locke, 540 U.S. at 731 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 156. Id. at 732. 
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freedom to decide whether to terminate her pregnancy.”157  Maher’s 
parallel to the Free Exercise Clause is readily apparent.  Just as the Free 
Exercise Clause does not grant an absolute right to any practice deemed 
religious (e.g., polygamy or illegal peyote use), it does protect against 
unduly burdensome governmental interference with free religious 
exercise.158  The Maher Court held constitutional a Connecticut Medicare 
program for indigents that only funded medically necessary abortions.159  
It relied heavily on the notion that a denial of benefits that would ease the 
exercise of a right differs substantially from a direct burden on the right 
itself.  The Court wrote, 
[t]here is a basic difference between direct state interference with a 
protected activity and state encouragement of an alternative activity 
consonant with legislative policy.  Constitutional concerns are greatest 
when the State attempts to impose its will by force of law; the State’s 
power to encourage actions deemed to be in the public interest is 
necessarily far broader.160 
Maher stands for the proposition that, at least within the abortion rights 
context, a denial of a benefit should not necessarily be viewed as a 
burden on a constitutionally protected right. 
It is tempting to reject the parallel to abortion rights as inapt, given 
the long acceptance of religious freedom rights compared to the 
relatively short recognition of abortion rights.  It is, however, 
illuminating that the Maher reasoning has been extended to a discussion 
of First Amendment rights.  In Sullivan v. Rust, a health program that 
provided local health clinics funding on the condition that recipient 
clinics not discuss abortion as a family-planning option was challenged 
as an impermissible burden on free speech rights.161  In upholding the 
program, the five-to-four majority (joined by Justice Scalia) noted that 
the Maher Court “rejected the claim that . . . unequal subsidation worked 
a violation of the Constitution.”162  The majority characterized the speech 
restrictions as part of a program where the government “has merely 
chosen to fund one activity to the exclusion of the other.”163  These 
words, incidentally, are similar to those Chief Justice Rehnquist used in 
                                                     
 157. 432 U.S. 464, 473–74 (1997). 
 158. See U.S. CONST. amend. I (Free Exercise Clause). 
 159. 432 U.S. at 481. 
 160. Id. at 475–76. 
 161. 500 U.S. 173 (1991). 
 162. Id. at 192. 
 163. Id. at 193. 
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describing the Washington scholarship exclusion for the Locke 
majority.164  On its face, Justice Scalia’s acceptance of the 
characterization of the medical benefits in Sullivan contrasts with his 
characterization of the benefits at issue in Locke: “When the State makes 
a public benefit generally available, that benefit becomes part of the 
baseline against which burdens on religion are measured.”165 
Additionally, Justice Scalia’s plurality opinion in Capitol Square 
Review & Advisory Board v. Pinette,166 held that the state could not 
prohibit the display by a private organization of a cross on a state-created 
public forum on Establishment Clause grounds where “the forum created 
by the State was open to a broad spectrum of groups and would provide 
only incidental benefit to religion.”167  In the words of one observer, 
[t]he plurality refused to evaluate whether the placement constituted an 
endorsement on the facts by concluding that allowing access to a public 
forum is inherently “neutral” and any benefit to religion is purely 
incidental. . . .  [I]f the government did not intend to send a message of 
endorsement, it is irrelevant that a message of endorsement was 
received.168 
The majority applied this reasoning to the burden/free exercise side of 
the equation in Locke, where the scholarship program was open to a 
broad spectrum of groups, where it would only incidentally burden 
religious free exercise, and where there was no government intent of 
animus toward religion. 
The fundamental conflict in Locke can thus be seen as a question of 
whether Davey’s burden should be evaluated from an equal protection 
standpoint, or whether it should follow the benefit-burden view of 
discrimination subscribed to by the Court in other civil rights cases.  The 
equal protection parallel is attractive in that it seems to err on the side of 
the protection of individual religious expression, but ultimately it seems 
a poor fit.  Equal protection arguments tend to apply when smaller, less 
politically powerful groups are unlikely to be able to ensure for 
themselves equal protection under the law.169  Had the Washington 
                                                     
 164. See Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 721 (2004) (“The state has merely chosen not to fund a 
distinct category of instruction.”). 
 165. Id. at 726 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 166. 515 U.S. 753 (1995). 
 167. Id. at 763. 
 168. Richard E. Levy, Dueling Values: Balancing Competing Constitutional Interests in Pinette, 
5 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 43, 45 (1996). 
 169. See, e.g., Mass. Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 313–14 (1976) (declining to apply 
strict scrutiny to age discrimination, in part on grounds that the aged as a class have not suffered a 
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statute refused to fund, for example, Muslim education specifically, the 
equal protection argument would certainly apply.  However, the claim 
that religion as a whole is a politically disadvantaged group is difficult to 
sell.  The impact of religious organizations on recent elections at all 
levels belies this notion.170  Additionally, there has been little Court 
discussion of treating religious persons on the whole as a suspect class,171 
the traditional trigger for the strict equal protection scrutiny the Locke 
dissent advocates.172  The Court, in numerous contentious constitutional 
areas, has had little trouble in treating the denial of a benefit as less 
odious than an actual direct burden on the exercise of a right.  The 
majority seems to stand on firmer ground than the dissent here, though it 
might have stated its position more forcefully. 
2. Clauses in Tension 
Even absent a showing of discrimination in Davey’s case, arguments 
can be made that the intellectual framework employed by the majority in 
reaching its decision, both alone and in combination with other 
precedent, might at least increase the potential for future religious 
discrimination.  Another crucial difference in philosophy between the 
positions advocated by the Locke majority and the dissent are the 
respective approaches to the resolution of cases in which the two religion 
clauses are particularly in tension.  Justice Scalia would have the Court 
continue its role as arbiter of such disputes; that is, adhere to the strict 
neutrality requirement.  The majority would delegate that role, at least 
some of the time, to state and local governments to allow some departure 
from the strict neutrality requirement.  This naturally requires exploration 
as to whether increased state and local discretion will lead to an 
increased opportunity for religious discrimination. 
In close cases such as Locke, any decision arguably will violate one 
or the other clause to some extent.  Generally speaking, by holding the 
                                                                                                                       
history of mistreatment on account of their age, nor have they “been subjected to unique disabilities 
on the basis of stereotyped characteristics not truly indicative of their ability”); see also ERWIN 
CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 642 (2001) (summarizing the arguments that strict scrutiny is 
not the proper standard with which to evaluate gender discrimination, especially given that women 
cannot be considered a politically powerless minority). 
 170. See, e.g., Michael Cornfield, The Congregation Factor, CAMPAIGNS & ELECTIONS, Dec. 
2004, at 73, 73 (arguing that while the political clout of religious conservatives is sometimes 
overstated, their impact on the 2004 elections was significant). 
 171. The Court has, however, on at least one occasion suggested that discrimination against 
religiousness (as opposed to a particular religion) may call for a “more searching judicial inquiry” 
into equal protection claims.  See United States v. Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). 
 172. See, e.g., Murgia, 427 U.S. at 313 (declining to treat the aged as a suspect class). 
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Washington statute constitutional, the majority burdened Davey’s free 
religious exercise, at least to a small extent.  If it had held the statute 
unconstitutional, Washington’s antiestablishment concerns, as expressed 
in its state constitution, would have been implicated, at least to a small 
extent.  What the Locke majority seemed to implicitly acknowledge was 
that the Court is no better equipped than a state legislature to determine 
which clause should be affected. 
In this sense, allowing state and local governments to decide the 
matter will not increase the possibility of discrimination any more than 
would allowing the Court to draw a constitutional line.  State 
governments are more likely to be responsive to local concerns, and they 
are more likely to possess the advantage of being more politically 
accountable than the federal judiciary.  From a practical standpoint, this 
responsiveness and political accountability may cut both ways.  Some 
commentators have argued that the threat from, for example, racial 
discrimination is greater at a state and local level.173  Some, however, 
have argued that centralized restrictions on how states may or must 
combat racial discrimination has an adverse affect on minorities;174 
others, that “decentralized government is a structural component of 
religious liberty.”175  Although such arguments are inevitable in a federal 
system (and probably will never be definitively settled), they serve to 
highlight, at the least, that discrimination may potentially emanate from 
both the national and local levels. 
                                                     
 173. See, e.g., Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., in which Justice Scalia, in a concurring opinion, 
wrote that “racial discrimination against any group finds a more ready expression at the state and 
local than at the federal level.”  488 U.S. 469, 523 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting).  He quoted James 
Madison: 
The smaller the society, the fewer probably will be the distinct parties and interests 
composing it; the fewer the distinct parties and interests, the more frequently will a 
majority be found of the same party; and the smaller the number of individuals 
composing a majority, and the smaller the compass within which they are placed, the 
more easily will they concert and execute their plan of oppression.  Extend the sphere and 
you take in a greater variety of parties and interests; you make it less probable that a 
majority of the whole will have a common motive to invade the rights of other citizens; 
or if such a common motive exists, it will be more difficult for all who feel it to discover 
their own strength and to act in unison with each other. 
Id. (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 82–84 (Clinton Rossiter ed. 1961)). 
 174. See, e.g., Lisa E. Chang, Remedial Purpose and Affirmative Action: False Limits and Real 
Harms, 16 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 59, 91—92 (1997) (arguing that Supreme Court mandated 
restrictions on affirmative action programs discourage minority participation in the political process, 
harming the interests of the government and the governed). 
 175. See Schragger, supra note 143, at 1820--31 (arguing that “the dispersal of authority is an 
independent institutional check on religious favoritism” and that national-level religious legislation 
might therefore be a greater threat to religious liberty than localized discrimination). 
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Viewed from this theoretical perspective, the Locke dissent’s 
approach would seem to offer no definitive advantage over the majority’s 
approach in preventing discrimination, but only to offer different 
advantages and disadvantages.  Further, the majority does not seek to 
eliminate its role in the review of religion cases altogether, and thereby 
to abandon free exercise oversight entirely, but merely to expand the 
boundaries of acceptable state and local behavior to a marginally greater 
extent. 
3. Boundaries of the Zone of Discretion 
This does, however, bring to light perhaps the greatest weakness of 
the majority opinion: its failure to delineate boundaries to this newly 
created zone of state and local discretion.  The dissent notes that the 
Locke “holding is limited to training the clergy, but its logic is readily 
extendible, and there are plenty of directions to go.”176  Zelman—Locke’s 
complementary other half—sets up minimum standards beyond which 
states cannot elect to go in funding religious education.  Specifically, 
these include neutrality toward religion and elements of genuine, 
individual, private choice.177  The Locke majority provides no similar 
guiding principles.  As a result, the dissent’s hypothetical situation 
wherein a state “den[ies] priests and nuns their prescription-drug benefits 
on the ground that taxpayers’ freedom of conscience forbids medicating 
the clergy at public expens[e],”178 while seemingly several logical steps 
away from Davey’s situation, was not definitively placed outside the 
realm of possibility.  On this theoretical level, the potential for 
discrimination is greater when the majority’s approach is followed.  It 
must be noted, however, that creating suitable boundaries to state and 
local discretion in free exercise issues would alleviate this concern. 
Of course, there are inherent dangers in granting states increased 
Religion Clause discretion.  Justice Scalia himself, writing for the Smith 
majority, admitted that “leaving accommodation [of individual religious 
practices] to the political process will place at a relative disadvantage 
those religious practices not widely engaged in.”179  While this statement 
applies to the Locke majority approach, the problem is inherent in the 
entire Smith analysis system.  None of the Locke justices suggest 
 
                                                     
 176. Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 734 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 177. Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 662 (2002). 
 178. Locke, 540 U.S. at 734 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 179. Employment Div., Dep’t of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 890 (1990). 
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abandoning the Smith approach and returning, for example, to the 
compelling state interest test. 
A detailed discussion of the benefits and shortcomings of the Smith 
approach to free exercise must necessarily be left to the voluminous 
literature on that case.  For purposes of the Locke discussion, however, 
several points are worth noting.  First, again, the Locke dissent’s 
approach would not necessarily provide any more protection against 
discrimination.180  Second, although the dissent claims that the 
discrimination safeguards set up in Lukumi have all but been ignored, the 
majority’s characterization of its decision as an attempt not to extend 
Lukumi beyond its logical boundaries is compelling, when taken into 
account with the majority’s view that the Locke question is not one of 
equal protection, but of denial of benefits.181  That is, the Court in 
Lukumi reaffirmed its commitment to disallow intentionally 
discriminatory or oppressively burdensome legislation, while allowing 
states to set their own policies without fear of a flood of litigation 
resulting from incidental or de minimis free exercise burdens, a sensible 
course. 
Importantly, neither side is abandoning Lukumi altogether.  The 
majority opinion indicates that the Court will continue to apply strict 
scrutiny where religious exercise becomes subject to civil or criminal 
penalties, or where it is grounds for exclusion from the political 
process.182  Additionally, it is difficult to see where a state or local 
government can provide a nondiscriminatory justification for burdening a 
particular religion, rather than religion generally.  Rather than weakening 
the Lukumi safeguards against discrimination, the Court merely declines 
to extend their application into a gray area, an area where discrimination 
might not even have occurred. 
C. The World After Locke 
Logically, one would expect the most immediate consequence of the 
Locke decision to be the stifling of school funding litigation prompted by 
the Zelman decision, including those suits brought by parties to force 
states to allow public educational funding to be made available to 
students who wish to attend parochial schools, as well as those by parties 
trying to resurrect state voucher-type programs previously declared by 
                                                     
 180. See discussion supra Part III.B.2. 
 181. See discussion supra Part III.B.1. 
 182. See Locke, 540 U.S. at 720 (rejecting presumptive unconstitutionality because the state’s 
disfavor of religion “imposes neither criminal nor civil sanctions”). 
GAUS FINAL.DOC 4/15/2006  10:46:22 AM 
582 KANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 54 
state courts to violate state constitution establishment clauses.  This has 
occurred to a certain extent. 
As an example, the First Circuit already has decided such a case in 
Eulitt ex rel Eulitt v. Maine, Department of Education.183  The court was 
asked to revisit an earlier decision184 in which it had held that Maine 
could properly exclude parochial schools from public funding programs 
without being subject to an equal protection challenge under the 
Establishment Clause.185  Two members of the appellate panel, in 
deciding the earlier case, indicated that reconsideration might be proper 
if their understanding of the Establishment Clause proved to be 
erroneous.186  On reconsideration, the appellate court ruled that, under 
their reading “the [Locke] decision . . . recognized that state entities, in 
choosing how to provide education, may act upon their legitimate 
concerns about excessive entanglement with religion, even though the 
Establishment Clause may not require them to do so,” and refused to 
overturn the earlier decision.187  Locke also had a strong influence on 
similar decisions in a federal district court in Florida188 and in a second 
First Circuit decision, this time involving the Massachusetts state 
constitution.189 
However, the failure of the Locke Court to provide any standards as 
to how far a state may stray from strict neutrality, as well as its failure to 
define the precise limitation of Locke’s scope, has, in at least one case, 
merely altered the approach that such school-voucher litigants have 
taken.  In Bush v. Holmes,190 the State of Florida had argued before the 
Florida Court of Appeals that if a constitutional provision prohibiting aid 
to religious institutions invalidated the voucher program, then that 
provision discriminated, in violation of the Free Exercise Clause, against 
                                                     
 183. 386 F.3d 344 (1st Cir. 2004). 
 184. Strout v. Albanese, 178 F.3d 57 (1st Cir. 1999). 
 185. Eulitt, 386 F.3d at 348. 
 186.  Id. 
 187. Id. at 355. 
 188. Children A & B, ex rel, Cooper v. Florida, 355 F. Supp. 2d 1298 (N.D. Fla. 2004), aff’d, 
140 F. App’x 845 (11th Cir., July 20, 2005) (holding that children have no constitutionally based 
rights to publicly funded religious education). 
 189. Wirzburger v. Galvin, 412 F.3d 271 (1st Cir. 2005).  The court upheld a district court 
decision that Massachusetts state constitutional provisions disallowing the use of public initiatives to 
amend the state constitutional prohibition on public funds going toward religious education did not 
violate the Free Exercise Clause.  The district court cited Locke in reaching its decision, noting that 
the constitutional provisions, like those of the Washington scholarship program, did not deny 
citizens a voice in the political affairs of the community nor force religious persons to choose 
between exercising their religion and receiving a benefit.  Id. at 280-81. 
 190. 886 So. 2d 340 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004) (en banc). 
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voucher recipients who preferred religious schools.191  The Florida Court 
of Appeals, citing Locke, held that the Federal Free Exercise Clause did 
not prohibit the Florida Constitution from espousing a stricter line 
regarding public funding reaching religious schools, but certified the 
question to the Florida Supreme Court, which has yet to address it.192 
The State, in its brief to the Florida Supreme Court, argued that 
Locke was restricted to its facts.  It distinguished the Opportunity 
Scholarship Program in that, unlike the Florida program, the Washington 
program at issue in Locke was inclusive of religious institutions—that is, 
the money could be used at religious colleges and universities—but was 
constitutional only insofar as the only exception contained in the 
program was for the study of devotional theology.193  Florida argued that 
invalidating the Florida program, by contrast, would prohibit all money 
from reaching public schools; this, arguably, places the Florida provision 
well outside Locke’s narrow prohibition and into Lukumi’s strict scrutiny 
territory.194  This argument again highlights Locke’s great flaw—the 
inability or unwillingness to set outer limits as to its central holding.  
Thus, such litigation seeking to force states to allow public funds to 
reach parochial institutions is likely to continue, at least until the Court is 
forced to step in and clarify itself. 
A second, perhaps more intriguing source of litigation is the use of 
the Locke holding as a federalist weapon.  That is, states attempting to 
excuse themselves from an obligation imposed on them by the federal 
government now have a new tool with which to bolster their arguments.  
The Supreme Court recently decided Cutter v. Wilkinson,195 in which 
such an argument was made.  The Sixth Circuit had held that a portion of 
the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000196 
(RLUIPA) was unconstitutional under the Establishment Clause.197  The 
portion in question forbade states from imposing burdens on the religious 
exercise of prisoners without a showing of a compelling interest and a 
showing that it had used the least restrictive means of advancing that 
interest.198  In its brief to the Supreme Court, Ohio argued that the federal 
                                                     
 191. Id. at 362–63. 
 192. Id. at 363–64. 
 193. Brief of Appellants at *37–38, Bush v. Holmes, Nos. SC04-2323, -2324 & -2325, available 
at 2005 WL 238735 (Fla. filed Jan. 2005). 
 194. Id. at *38. 
 195. 125 S. Ct. 2113 (2005). 
 196. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1 (2000). 
 197. Cutter v. Wilkinson, 349 F.3d 257, 268–69 (6th Cir.2003), rev’d, 125 S. Ct. 2113 (2005). 
 198. Cutter, 125 S. Ct. at 2118–19. 
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government had overstepped its Establishment Clause authority.199  Ohio 
claimed that Congress required “that States provide religious 
accommodations in their prisons—accommodations that go beyond those 
the Constitution requires, and that compromise prison security.”200  
Further, RLUIPA “is a powerful tool that prisoners advancing religious 
claims can use to obtain accommodations,” as Congress has required that 
strict scrutiny be applied to claims by prisoners for 
nonaccommodation.201  Interestingly, Ohio argued that, after Locke, the 
Supreme Court would recognize a “federalist aspect” to the 
Establishment Clause.202  Essentially, “the State has the right to make 
policy within the ‘play in the joints’ between the Establishment and Free 
Exercise clauses, and Congress may not order us to pick a different point 
in that spectrum.”203  This novel use of the Locke holding exploits the 
new zone of state discretion set up by the Court. 
The Court held RLUIPA constitutional in a unanimous decision, but 
the majority only cited Locke to support the notion that play in the joints 
existed.204  Justice Thomas filed a concurring opinion in which he 
addressed and rejected what he called “the federalism aspect” of Ohio’s 
argument; his rejection, however, was based on a narrow historical 
reading of the word “establishment,” and did not specifically attack 
Ohio’s contention that Locke fundamentally redefined the state-federal 
Religion Clause relationship.205  A similar argument has been raised in an 
amicus brief to the Court in the upcoming assisted suicide case, Gonzalez 
v. Oregon.206 
In essence, by creating the zone of discretion in the religion clauses, 
the Locke court gave at least implied legitimacy to the notion that, within 
certain limits, the federal government is not authorized to interfere with 
                                                     
 199. Brief for Respondents at *1, Cutter, 125 S. Ct. 2113 (No. 03-9877), available at 2005 WL 
363713. 
 200. Id. at *1. 
 201. Id. 
 202. Id. at *11. 
 203. Id. (internal citation omitted). 
 204. Cutter, 125 S. Ct. at 2117, 2121. 
 205. Id. at 2125–29 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 206. Brief for 52 Religious and Religious Freedom Organizations and Leaders as Amici Curiae 
Supporting Respondents at *16–18, Gonzalez v. Oregon, 125 S. Ct. 1299 (2005) (No. 04-623), 
available at 2005 WL 1687166.  The Respondents seek to invalidate a directive by then-Attorney 
General John Ashcroft that would strip any physician assisting in the death of another under 
Oregon’s Death With Dignity Act of the ability to prescribe medication.  The brief cites Locke in 
support of the proposition that states may draw a more stringent line than does the United States 
Constitution to better protect its citizenry.  The brief further states that “[s]uch state prerogatives to 
grant enhanced religious freedoms also spring in part from the role of the states as ‘experimental 
laboratories’ under the principles of federalism.”  Id. at *17. 
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state religious policy.  This argument has yet to be squarely addressed by 
any federal court.  Given, however, that in the brief interval since Locke 
was decided, such an argument has been made in such disparate contexts 
as prisoner worship and euthanasia, Locke can be seen as another tool for 
use by states attempting to resist what they perceive as federal 
encroachment on their legislative prerogatives.  Locke makes this 
possible by pushing Religion Clause jurisprudence down the path toward 
a greater accommodation of state and local preferences, but fails to flesh 
out the doctrine or set out any ground rules, making it quite likely that a 
good deal of litigation based on the intersection of federalist and 
Religion Clause concerns will be seen in the next few years. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court’s ruling in Locke v. Davey seems to be 
motivated by prudent concerns, even if imperfectly justified.  The 
decision is not likely to significantly increase the opportunities for 
religious discrimination.  The decision has the added benefit of 
prescribing previously undefined limits on both the Lukumi and the 
Zelman decisions.  The decision restores a certain amount of rightful, 
policy-making authority to state and local elected lawmakers, both in the 
area of religious education and beyond.  Perhaps most importantly, it 
steps toward bringing free-exercise analysis in line with benefit-burden 
analysis in other areas of constitutional law, and it helps to clarify that, as 
between religion and secularism, the proper analysis is not one of equal 
protection. 
The decision’s primary weakness lies in its inability or unwillingness 
to clearly define the boundaries of state and local discretion as regards 
free exercise.  Had the Court done so, the dissent’s fears of an indefinite 
extension of the majority’s logic would have proved unfounded.  Further, 
Locke does little to stem the flow of litigation by citizens demanding that 
their states make funding available to them for private school tuition.  A 
holding by the majority clarifying the free exercise boundaries of the 
zone of discretion—for example, allowing incidental implication of free 
exercise or a de minimis burden on free exercise—would have quelled 
fears of unmedicated clergymen.  While it is not particularly difficult to 
divine such standards through prior precedent, the opinion would have 
been the stronger for an explicit recognition of these, or similar 
standards. 
While maintaining a strict standard toward obviously hostile 
treatment of religion, the Court has reaffirmed a commitment, alluded to 
by at least one Justice in his Zelman concurrence, to allow states the 
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flexibility to experiment with differing policies regarding religion and 
public funding.207  While not necessarily providing any more individual 
rights protection than before the decision, Locke seems to have delivered 
at least a modicum of clarity as to which direction the Court seems to be 
traveling in Religion Clause jurisprudence. 
                                                     
 207. Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 680 (2002) (Thomas, J., concurring) (arguing 
against the dissent’s attempt “to handcuff the State’s ability to experiment with education”). 
